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Simple power analysis attack against elliptic curve cryptography processor on FPGA implementation
Kadir S.A.a, Sasongko A.a, Zulkifli M.a
a Electrical Engineering, Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]The additional information (side effects) in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) hardware can be used to attack cryptographic systems. Additional information related to time, power consumption and electromagnetic radiation. Side channel attacks have been done with SPA (Simple Power Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis) and DEMA (Differential Electromagnetic Analysis). Some scalar multiplication algorithm can be used to countermeasure SPA attack on elliptic curve cryptography. In this study, conducted experiments side-channel attacks ECC hardware implementations use binary algorithms by observing power consumption of ECC processor on FPGA. Experimental of side-channel attack is conducted to guess the secret key for data encryption and decryption by looking at the physical differences on hardware side effects. In this study, side-channel attack experimental is successful 100% get the key by analyzing of power consumption ECC processor. © 2011 IEEE.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Binary algorithms,Cryptographic systems,Data encryption,Differential power Analysis,Electromagnetic analysis,Elliptic curve cryptography,Elliptic curve cryptography processors,FPGA implementations,Hardware implementations,Non-Adjacent-From,Scalar multiplication,Secret key,Side channel attack,Side effect,Simple power analysis,SPA[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Elliptic curve cryptography,Non-Adjacent-From,side effect,SPA[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEEI.2011.6021757[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]