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Modelling and analysis of maintenance contract with imperfect preventive maintenance
Husniah H.a, Cakravastia A.b, Iskandar B.P.b, Pasaribu U.S.b
a Dept. of Industrial Engineering, Langlangbuana University, Bandung, Indonesia
b Dept. of Industrial Engineering, Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung, Indonesia
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]© 2015 IEEE.In this paper, we study two dimensional maintenance contracts for a dump truck operated in a mining industry. To keep the truck in a good operational condition, an imperfect preventive maintenance (PM) policy is applied. When the truck fails then corrective maintenance (CM) is done. PM and/or CM can be outsourced to an external agent for economic reason. The situation under study is that an agent offers two dimensional service contract to the owner of the trucks and the agent’s decision problem has to select the optimal PM degree according to various usage pattern and the operational condition that maximizes the expected profit. We use a Nash game theory formulation in order to obtain a win-win solution – i.e. the optimal strategy (pricing structure) for the agent and the owner.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Corrective maintenance,Imperfect preventive maintenance,Maintenance contracts,Modelling and analysis,Nash equilibria,Operational conditions,Optimal strategies,pinalty[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]imperfect preventive maintenance,maintenance contract,Nash equilibrium,pinalty[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]https://doi.org/10.1109/TIME-E.2015.7389742[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]