Enter your keyword

2-s2.0-84988311293

[vc_empty_space][vc_empty_space]

Performance based lease contract involving discrete preventive maintenance

Pakpahan E.K.A.a, Iskandar B.P.a

a Industrial Engineering Department, Harapan Bangsa Institute of Technology, Bandung, Indonesia

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]© 2006-2016 Asian Research Publishing Network (ARPN). All rights reserved.Numerous studies have considered penalty as part of lease contract stipulation, which incurs whenever equipment downtime exceed a predetermined level. Under this stipulation, lessor would then choose maintenance effort level just enough to hinder them from penalty. Since it is used for business purpose, lower equipment downtime would always preferable for the lessee but necessarily for the lessor. Lower downtime requires higher maintenance effort, thus higher cost. To make sure that lessor is putting their best effort to achieve the lowest downtime possible a proper incentive needs to be determined. This paper considers not only penalty but also incentive as part of contract stipulation. We adopt the perspective of lessee and build decision making model for determining lease contract price and performance based payment scheme to be offered to the lessor. Principal agent theory is used as modeling approach due to its ability to simultaneously consider the interest of both parties involved.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Incentive,Lease contract,Penalty,Performance based scheme,Principal agent theory[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]