[vc_empty_space][vc_empty_space]
Non-cooperative and cooperative solutions of government subsidy on public transportation
Husniah H.a, Pasaribu U.S.b, Beta Y.Z.b, Supriatna A.K.c
a Engineering Department, Langlangbuana University, Bandung, Indonesia
b Mathematics Department, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia
c Mathematics Department, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences, 2018.The paper deals with two models of government subsidy given to a public transport operator: (i) the subsidy for buying bus from an appointed public transport manufacturer, and (ii) the subsidy for reimbursing reduced ticket price for passengers. The models are developed to determine the maximum profit for both the public transport operator and the manufacturer. Since we consider two parties – the public transport operator and the manufacturer of the bus, then we use game theoretical approach by considering non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. Furthermore, since the bus is repairable we consider virtual age to model the preventive maintenance and we consider minimal repair to model the corrective maintenance. We analyse both type of subsidy models and give some numerical examples which show the effects of different subsidies to the profit of operator and manufacturer. The result of the numerical examples indicates that reducing ticket price would give a higher profit both to the operator and the manufacturer.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Corrective maintenance,Government subsidies,Maximum profits,Non-cooperative,Public transport,Public transport operators,Public transportation,Theoretical approach[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]H.H. acknowledges support from Kemenristekdikti for the PUPT research grant contract number SP DIPA/042.06.1.014 516/2017 and A.K.S. acknowledges support from Universitas Padjadjaran, due to the funding to parts of this work through the scheme of Academic Leadership Grant (ALG) with contract number 855/UN6.3.1/PL/201 7.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201815401070[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]