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Game-Theoretic Models for Usage-based Maintenance Contract

Husniah H.a, Wangsaputra R.b, Cakravastia A.b, Iskandar B.P.b

a Industrial Engineering, Langlangbuana University, Bandung, 40261, Indonesia
b Department of Industrial Engineering, Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung, 40132, Indonesia

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]© Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd.A usage-based maintenance contracts with coordination and non coordination between two parties is studied in this paper. The contract is applied to a dump truck operated in a mining industry. The situation under study is that an agent offers service contract to the owner of the truck after warranty ends. This contract has only a time limit but no usage limit. If the total usage per period exceeds the maximum usage allowed in the contract, then the owner will be charged an additional cost. In general, the agent (Original Equipment Manufacturer/OEM) provides a full coverage of maintenance, which includes PM and CM under the lease contract. The decision problem for the owner is to select the best option offered that fits to its requirement, and the decision problem for the agent is to find the optimal maintenance efforts for a given price of the service option offered. We first find the optimal decisions using coordination scheme and then with non coordination scheme for both parties.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Additional costs,Coordination scheme,Decision problems,Game-theoretic model,Maintenance contracts,Optimal decisions,Optimal maintenance,Original equipment manufacturers[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]This work is funded by the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia through the scheme of “PUPT 2017” with contract number SP DIPA-042.06.1.401516/ 2017.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899X/319/1/012003[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]