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A maintenance service contract for a warranted product
Husniah H.a,b, Pasaribu U.S.a, Halim A.H.a, Iskandar B.P.a
a Department of Industrial Engineering, Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung 40132, Indonesia
b Department of Industrial Engineering, Langlangbuana University, Bandung 40132, Indonesia
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624529070653{padding-top: 30px !important;padding-bottom: 30px !important;}”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner layout=”boxed”][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″ css=”.vc_custom_1624695412187{border-right-width: 1px !important;border-right-color: #dddddd !important;border-right-style: solid !important;border-radius: 1px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Abstract” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]In this paper, we investigate a maintenance service contract for a warranted product carried out by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The model was developed under the assumption that there are one consumer and one service provider who is the OEM. This is typically applied to the situation where the OEM is the only service provider such as in the mining industry. From the OEM point of view, two contract options were considered, they are: the OEM carried out all repairs and preventive maintenance activities; the OEM carries out failure and the customer undertakes in house preventive maintenance actions. The model uses a non-cooperative game formulation by maximizing expected profits. We use a linear function of failure intensity to consider a product with increasing failure intensity. We obtain the pricing structure in the contract. And for the customer, they can choose the optimal option under the term of contract. © 2011 IEEE.[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Author keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]Expected profits,Failure intensity,Linear functions,Maintenance services,Noncooperative game,Original equipment manufacturers,Pricing structures,Service contract[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Indexed keywords” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]game theory,Maintenance,service contract[/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”Funding details” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_empty_space][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][vc_empty_space][megatron_heading title=”DOI” size=”size-sm” text_align=”text-left”][vc_column_text]https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM.2011.6118182[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_column_text]Widget Plumx[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1624528584150{padding-top: 25px !important;padding-bottom: 25px !important;}”][/vc_column][/vc_row]